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ABSTRACT
Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sen-
sitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings
or interrupt information to monitor keystroke timings and sub-
sequently infer typed words and sentences. Previously proposed
countermeasures fail to prevent keystroke timing attacks as they do
not protect keystroke processing among the entire software stack.
We close this gap with KeyDrown, a new defense mechanism
against keystroke timing attacks. KeyDrown injects a large number
of fake keystrokes in the kernel to prevent interrupt-based attacks
and Prime+Probe attacks on the kernel. All keystrokes, including
fake keystrokes, are carefully propagated through the shared library
in order to hide any cache activity and thus to prevent Flush+Reload
attacks. Finally, we provide additional protection against Prime+
Probe for password input in user space programs. We show that
attackers cannot distinguish fake keystrokes from real keystrokes
anymore and we evaluate KeyDrown on a commodity notebook
as well as on two Android smartphones. We show that KeyDrown
eliminates any advantage an attacker can gain from using interrupt
or cache side-channel information.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Modern computer systems leak sensitive user information through
side channels. Among software-based side channels, information
can leak, for example, from the system or from microarchitectural
components such as the CPU cache [12] or the DRAM [36]. His-
torically, side-channel attacks have exploited these information
leaks to infer cryptographic secrets [4, 25, 34, 51], whereas more
recent attacks even target keystroke timings and sensitive user
input directly [15, 33, 36].
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In general, keystroke attacks aim to monitor when a keyboard
input occurs, which either allows inferring user input directly or
launching follow-up attacks [43, 53]. In particular, mobile devices
may expose this information through sensor data, but practical
mitigations are being deployed [44]. Consequently, attackers are
left with two different ways to obtain keystroke timings in a generic
way. First, the procfs interface provides statistics for all interrupt
sources, which allows monitoring the occurrence of keyboard inter-
rupts. Second, microarchitectural attacks allowmonitoring memory
accesses with a granularity of single cache lines, and thus also allow
recovering keystroke timings with a high accuracy.
Keystroke timing attacks are hard to mitigate, compared to side-
channel attacks on cryptographic implementations. Indeed, attacks
on cryptographic implementations can be mitigated with changes
in the algorithms, such as making execution paths independent of
secret data. On the contrary, user input travels a long way, from
the hardware interrupt through the operating system and shared
libraries up to the user space application. In order to detect a key-
stroke, an attacker just needs to probe a single spot in the keystroke
path for activity.
In the general case, keystrokes are non-repeatable low-frequency
events, i.e., if the attacker misses a keystroke, there is no way to re-
peat the measurement. However, an attacker that explicitly targets
a password field can record more timing traces when the user enters
the password again. While these traces have variations in timing,
due to the variance of the typing behavior, it allows an attacker to
combine multiple traces and to perform a more sophisticated attack.
This makes attacks on password fields even harder to mitigate.
State-of-the art defense mechanisms only restrict access to the
system interfaces providing interrupt statistics [10, 53], and do not
address all the layers involved in keystroke processing. Therefore,
this does not prevent keystroke attacks at all. We first investigate
interrupt-based attacks in a setting where the operating system
does not provide any interface for interrupt statistics to the user. In
such a restricted setting, we demonstrate two novel side-channel
attacks to infer keystroke timings. The first attack uses the rdtsc
instruction to determine the execution time of an interrupt service
routine (ISR), which is then used to determine whether or not
the interrupt was caused by the keyboard. The second attack uses
Prime+Probe on the kernel to determine when a keystroke is being
processed in the kernel.
Based on these investigations and on state-of-the-art attacks, we
identify three essential requirements for successful elimination of
keystroke timing attacks on the entire software stack. In presence
of the countermeasure:
(1) Any classifier based on a single-trace side-channel attack
may not provide any advantage over a random classifier.
(2) The number of side-channel traces a classifier requires to
detect all keystrokes correctly must be impractically high.
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(3) The implementation of the countermeasure may not leak
information about its activity or computations.
Based on the identified requirements, we present KeyDrown,
a new defense mechanism against keystroke timing attacks ex-
ploiting microarchitectural side channels and interrupt side chan-
nels. KeyDrown covers the entire software stack, from the interrupt
source to the user space buffer storing the keystroke, both on x86
systems and on ARM devices. We cover both the general case where
an attacker can only obtain a single trace, and the case of password
input where an attacker can obtainmultiple traces.KeyDrownworks
in three layers:
(1) To mitigate interrupt-based attacks, KeyDrown injects a
large number of fake keyboard interrupts. Prime+Probe
attacks on the kernel module are mitigated by unifying the
control flow and data accesses of real and fake keystrokes
such that there is no difference visible in the cache or in
the execution time.
(2) To mitigate Flush+Reload, and Prime+Probe attacks on
shared libraries, KeyDrown runs through the same code
path in the shared library for every fake and real keystroke.
(3) To mitigate Prime+Probe attacks on password entry fields,
KeyDrown updates the widget buffer for every fake and
real keystroke.
We evaluate KeyDrown on several state-of-the-art attacks as
well as our two novel attacks. In all cases, KeyDrown eliminates
any advantage an attacker can gain from the side channels, i.e., the
attacker cannot deduce sensitive information from the side channel.
We provide a proof-of-concept implementation, which can be
installed as a Debian package compatible with the latest long-term
support release of Ubuntu. It runs on commodity operating systems
with unmodified applications and unmodified compilers. KeyDrown
is started automatically and is entirely transparent to the user,
i.e., requires no user interaction. Although our countermeasure
inherently executes more code than an unprotected system, it has
no noticeable effect on keystroke latency. Finally, we also define
what KeyDrown cannot protect against, such as word completion
lookups or immediate forwarding of single keystrokes over the
network.
Contributions. The contributions of this work are:
(1) We present two novel attack vectors to recover keystroke
timings with fewer prerequisites than previous attacks.
(2) We identify three essential requirements for an effective
countermeasure against keystroke attacks.
(3) We propose KeyDrown, a multi-layered solution to mitigate
keystroke timing attacks.1
(4) We evaluate KeyDrown and show that it eliminates all
known attacks.
Outline. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide background information. In Section 3, we
introduce our novel attacks and define requirements a defense
mechanism has to provide to successfully mitigate attacks. In Sec-
tion 4, we describe the three layers of KeyDrown. In Section 5, we
1The KeyDrown project is open-source and is available on GitHub:
https://github.com/keydrown/keydrown.
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Figure 1: Linux interrupt handling on x86.
demonstrate that KeyDrown successfully mitigates keystroke tim-
ing attacks. In Section 6, we discuss limitations and future work.
We conclude in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide background information on interrupt
handling as well as on software side channels that leak keystroke
timing information.
2.1 Linux Interrupt Handling
Interrupt handling is one of the low-level tasks of an operating
system and thus highly architecture and machine dependent. This
section covers the general design of how interrupts and their han-
dling within the Linux kernel work on both x86 PCs and ARMv7
smartphones.
2.1.1 Interrupts on x86 and x86_64. Figure 1 shows a high-level
overview of interrupt handling on a dual-core x86 CPU. Interrupts
are handled by the Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
(APIC) [20]. The APIC receives interrupts from different sources:
locally and externally connected I/O devices, inter-processor inter-
rupts, APIC internal interrupts, performance monitoring interrupts,
and thermal sensor interrupts. On multi-core systems, every CPU
core has a local APIC (LAPIC) to handle interrupts. All LAPICs are
connected to one or more I/O APICs which handle the actual hard-
ware interrupts. The I/O APICs are part of the chipset and provide
multi-core interrupt management by distributing the interrupts to
the LAPICs as described in the ACPI system description tables [31].
Interrupt-generating hardware, such as the keyboard, is con-
nected to an I/O APIC pin ( 1 ). The I/O APIC uses a redirection
table to redirect hardware interrupts and the raised interrupt vector
to the destination LAPIC ( 2 ) [19]. In the case of multiple config-
ured LAPICs for one interrupt, the I/O APIC chooses a CPU based
on task priorities in a round-robin fashion [6].
The LAPIC receiving the interrupt vector fetches the correspond-
ing entry from the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) ( 3 ) which is
set up by the operating system. The IDT contains an offset to the
Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) for every interrupt vector. The CPU
saves the current CPU flags and jumps to the interrupt service
routine ( 4 ) which then handles the interrupt.
After processing, the interrupt service routine acknowledges the
interrupt by sending an end-of-interrupt (EOI) to the LAPIC ( 5 ).
It then returns using the iret instruction to restore the CPU flags
and to enable interrupts again. The LAPIC forwards the EOI to the
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Figure 2: Linux interrupt handling on ARM.
I/O APIC ( 6 ) which then resets the interrupt line to enable the
corresponding interrupt again.
2.1.2 Interrupts on ARM. Figure 2 shows a high-level overview
of interrupt handling on a dual-core ARMv7 CPU. On ARM, inter-
rupts are handled by the General Interrupt Controller (GIC). The
GIC is divided into two parts, the distributor, and a CPU interface for
every CPU core [3]. Every interrupt-generating device is connected
to the distributor of the GIC ( 1 ). The distributor ( 2 ) schedules
between CPU interfaces according to the interrupt’s affinity mask.
When a CPU interface receives an interrupt, it signals it to the
corresponding CPU core ( 3 ). The core reads the interrupt number
from the interrupt acknowledge register to acknowledge it. If the
interrupt was sent to multiple CPU interfaces, all other CPU cores
receive a spurious interrupt, as there is no more pending interrupt.
When receiving an interrupt, the CPU finishes executing the
current instruction, switches to IRQ mode, and jumps to the IRQ
entry of the Interrupt Vector Table (IVT) ( 4 ). The IVT contains
exactly one instruction to jump to a handler function ( 5 ). In this
handler function, the OS branches to the Interrupt Service Routine
(ISR) corresponding to the interrupt number ( 6 ).
When the CPU is done servicing the interrupt, it writes the
interrupt number to the End Of Interrupt register ( 7 ) to signal that
it is ready to receive this interrupt again [2].
2.2 Microarchitectural Attacks
CPU caches are a small and fast type of memory, buffering fre-
quently used data to speed-up subsequent accesses. There are typi-
cally three levels of caches in modern x86 CPUs, and two levels in
modern ARM CPUs. The last-level cache is typically shared across
cores of the same CPU, which makes it a target for cross-core side-
channel attacks. On Intel x86 CPUs, the last-level cache is divided
into one slice per core. The smallest unit managed by a cache is a
cache line (typically 64 B). Modern caches are set-associative, i.e.,
multiple cache lines are considered a set of equivalent storage loca-
tions. A memory location maps to a cache set and slice based on
the physical address [18, 28, 52].
Flush+Reload. Flush+Reload [16, 51] is a technique that allows
an attacker to monitor a victim’s cache accesses at a granularity of
a single cache line. The attacker flushes a cache line, lets the victim
perform an operation, and then reloads and times the access to
the cache line. A low timing indicates that the victim accessed the
cache line. While very accurate, it can only be performed on shared
memory, i.e., shared libraries or binary code. Flush+Reload can
neither be performed on dynamic buffers in a user program nor on
code or data in the kernel. Gruss et al. [15] presented cache template
attacks as a technique based on Flush+Reload to automatically find
and exploit cache-based leakage in programs.
Prime+Probe. Prime+Probe [25, 34, 35] is a technique that allows
an attacker to monitor a victim’s cache accesses at a granularity of
a cache set. The attacker primes a cache set, i.e., fills the cache set
with its own cache lines. It then lets the victim perform an operation.
Finally, it probes its own cache lines i.e., measures the access time to
them. This technique does not require any shared memory between
the attacker and the victim, but it is difficult due to the mapping
between physical addresses and cache sets and slices. As Prime+
Probe only relies on measuring the latency of memory accesses, it
can be performed on any part of the software stack. It is possible
to perform Prime+Probe on dynamically generated data [24] as
well as kernel memory [34]. Preventing Prime+Probe attacks is
difficult due to the huge attack surface and the fact that Prime+
Probe uses only innocuous operations such as memory accesses on
legitimately allocated memory, as well as timing measurements.
DRAMA. Besides the cache, the DRAM design also introduces
side channels [36], i.e., timing differences caused by the DRAM
row buffer. A DRAM bank contains a row buffer caching an entire
DRAM row (8 KB). Requests to the currently active row are served
from this buffer, resulting in a fast access, whereas other requests
are significantly slower. DRAM side-channel attacks do not require
shared memory and work across CPUs of the same machine sharing
a DRAM module.
2.3 Keystroke Timing Attacks
Keystrokes from Keystroke Timing. Keystroke timing attacks at-
tempt to recover what was typed by the user by analyzing keystroke
timing measurements. These timings show characteristic patterns
of the user, which depend on several factors such as keystroke se-
quences on the level of single letters, bigrams, syllables or words as
well as keyboard layout and typing experience [37]. Existing attacks
train probabilistic classifiers like hidden Markov models or neural
networks to infer known words or to reduce the password-guessing
complexity [42, 43, 53].
Most keystroke timing attacks exploit the inter-keystroke timing,
i.e., the timing difference between two keystrokes, but according to
Idrus et al. [17] combinations of key press and key release events
could also be exploited. Pinet et al. [37] report inter-keystroke inter-
val values between 160ms and 200ms for skilled typists. Lee et al.
[23] define the values depending on whether a text sequence was
trained or entered for the first time, resulting in inter-keystroke in-
tervals between 125ms and 215ms with a variance between 43ms
and 106ms, again for trained and untrained text sequences.
Keystroke Timing from Software. A direct software side channel
for keystroke timings is provided through OS interfaces [43, 53].
This includes instruction pointer and stack pointer information
leaked through /proc/stat, interrupt statistics leaked through
/proc/interrupts, and network packet statistics leaked through
/proc/net [53]. As the instruction pointer and stack pointer infor-
mation became too unpredictable, Jana and Shmatikov [21] showed
that CPU usage yields much more reliable information on keystroke
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timings. Diao et al. [10] demonstrated high-precision keystroke tim-
ing attacks based on /proc/interrupts. Vila et al. [47] recovered
keystroke timings from timing differences caused by the event
queue in the Chrome browser.
Keystroke Timing from Microarchitectural Attacks. Gruss et al.
[15] demonstrated that Flush+Reload allows distinguishing specific
keys or groups of keys based on key-dependent data accesses in
shared libraries. Ristenpart et al. [39] demonstrated a keystroke
timing attack using Prime+Probe with a false-negative rate of 5 %
while measuring 0.3 false positive keystrokes per second. Pessl et al.
[36] showed that it is possible to use DRAM attacks to monitor
keystrokes, e.g., in the address bar of Firefox. However, this attack
only works if the target application performs a massive amount of
memory accesses to thrash the cache reliably on its own.
3 KEYSTROKE TIMING ATTACKS &
DEFENSES
Due to the amount of code executed for every keystroke, there are
many different side channels for keystroke timings. In this section,
we introduce our two novel attacks and compare them to state-of-
the-art keystroke timing attack vectors, in order to understand the
requirements for effective countermeasures. Finally, we derive three
requirements for countermeasures to be effective against keystroke
timing attacks.
The requirements are defined based on precision and recall of
side-channel attacks. The precision is the fraction of true positive
detected keystrokes in all detected keystrokes. If the precision is
low, the side channel yields too many false positives to derive the
correct keystroke timings. The recall is the fraction of true positive
detected keystrokes in all real keystrokes. If the recall is low, i.e.,
the side channel misses too many true positives, inter-keystroke
timings are corrupted too. A standard measure for accuracy is the
F-score, i.e., the geometric mean of precision and recall. An F-score
of 1 describes a perfect side channel. An F-score of 0 describes that
a side channel provides no information at all.
Note that there is only a limited number of keystroke time
frames that can be reliably distinguished by an attacker, due to
the number of keystrokes a user performs and the variance of
inter-keystroke timing (cf. Section 2.3). A keystroke timing attack
providing nanosecond-accurate timestamps is actually only pro-
viding the binary information in which time frames a keystroke
occurred. Hence, we can compare side-channel-based classifiers to
binary decision classifiers for these time frames.
An always-zero oracle which never detects any event has an F-
score of 0. An always-one oracle which “detects” an event in every
possible time frame, i.e., a large number of false positives, no false
negatives, and no true negatives, is a channel which provides zero
information. Similarly, a random-guessing oracle, which decides
for every possible time frame whether it “detects” an event based
on an apriori probability, also provides zero information. For 8
keystrokes and 100 possible time frames per second, the F-score
for the always-one oracle is 0.15 which is strictly better than the
F-score of the random-guessing oracle (0.14). An attacker relying
on any side-channel-based classifier with a lower F-score could
achieve better results by simply using an always-one oracle, i.e., in
such a case it would not make sense to use the side-channel-based
Table 1: Comparison of keystroke timing attacks.
Kernel Shared library User process
Interface-based ✓ [10, 21, 43, 53] – –
Timing-based ✓ new – –
Flush+Reload – ✓ [15] –
Prime+Probe on L1 ✓ [39] ✓ [39] ✓ [39]
Prime+Probe on LLC ✓ new ✓ new ✓ new
DRAMA – – ✓ [36]
classifier in the first place. In the remainder of the paper we assume
that an attacker wants to find the real 8 keystrokes in 100 possible
time frames per second.
3.1 Keystroke Timing Attack Surface
Keystroke processing involves computations on all levels of the
software stack. The keyboard interrupt is handled by one of the
CPU cores, which interrupts the currently executed thread. A sig-
nificant amount of code is executed in the operating system kernel
and the keyboard driver until the preprocessed keystroke event is
handed over to a user space shared library that is part of the user
interface. The shared library distributes the keystroke event to all
user interface elements listening for the event. Finally, the shared li-
brary hands over the keyboard input to the active user space process
which further processes the input, e.g., store a password character
in a buffer. This abundance of code and data that is executed and
accessed upon a keystroke provides a multitude of possibilities to
measure keystroke timings.
3.2 New Attack Vectors
Software side channels through procfs interfaces can be mitigated
by restricting access to them [10, 53]. However, such restrictions
do not prevent keystroke timing attacks. We demonstrate two new
attacks to infer keystroke timings: the first one exploits interrupt
timings to detect keystrokes, and the second one relies on Prime+
Probe to attack a kernel module. Table 1 compares the novel attacks
we describe in the following with the state-of-the-art attack vectors
(cf. Section 2.3) in terms of attack techniques and the exploited
attack surface.
Low-Requirement Interrupt Timing Attack. We propose a new
timing-based attack that only requires unprivileged sand-boxed
code execution on the targeted platform and an accurate timing
source, e.g., the rdtsc instruction or a counter thread. The basic
idea is to monitor differences in the execution time of acquiring
high-precision time stamps, e.g., the rdtsc instruction, as outlined
in Algorithm 1. While small differences between successive time
stamps allow us to infer the CPU utilization, larger differences in-
dicate that the measurement process was interrupted. In particular,
I/O events like keyboard interrupts lead to clearly visible peaks in
the execution time, due to the interaction of the keyboard ISR with
hardware and the subsequent processing of keystrokes.
Figure 3 illustrates these observations in a timing trace recorded
while the user was typing a password. The bars indicate actual key-
stroke events, which almost perfectly match certain measurement
points. Based on this plot, we can clearly distinguish keyboard in-
terrupts (around 60 000 cycles) from other interrupts. For example,
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Algorithm 1: Recording interrupt timing
input : threshold, N
output : events[ ], diff [ ]
tsc[0] ← rdtsc();
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,N } do
tsc[i] ← rdtsc();
if tsc[i] − tsc[i − 1] > threshold then
events[i] ← tsc[i];
diff [i] ← tsc[i] − tsc[i − 1];
end
end
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Figure 3: Measured delta between continuous rdtsc calls
while entering a password. Keystroke events interrupt the
attacker and thus cause higher deltas.
rescheduling interrupts can be observed with a difference of about
155 000 cycles. In this attack, we achieve a precision of 0.89 and a
recall of 1, resulting in an F-score of 0.94, which means a significant
advantage over an always-one oracle of +537.4 %.
Multi-Prime+Probe Attack on the Kernel. Our second attack relies
on Prime+Probe to attack the keyboard interrupt handler within
the kernel. More specifically, we target the code in the keyboard in-
terrupt handler that is executed each time a key is pressed. Thereby,
keystroke events can be inferred by observing cache activity in the
cache set used by the keyboard interrupt handler.
To find the cache sets that are accessed by the keyboard interrupt
handler, we first need to find the physical addresses where the code
is located. We can either use the prefetch side-channel attack by
Gruss et al. [13] or the TSX-based side channel by Jang et al. [22]
to locate the code within the kernel. Kernel Address-Space-Layout
Randomization was not enabled by default until Ubuntu 16.10. Thus,
an attacker can also just use known physical addresses from an
attacker-controlled system.
To reduce the influence of systemnoise, we developed a new form
of Prime+Probe attack called Multi-Prime+Probe. Multi-Prime+
Probe combines the information frommultiple simultaneous Prime+
Probe attacks on different addresses. Figure 4 shows the result of
such a Multi-Prime+Probe attack on the keyboard interrupt handler.
In a post-processing step we smoothed the Multi-Prime+Probe
trace with a 500 µs sliding window. The keystroke events cause
higher activity in the targeted cache sets and thus produce clearly
recognizable peaks for every key event. Despite doubts that such an
attack can be mounted [14], our attack is the first highly accurate
keystroke timing attack based on Prime+Probe on the last-level
cache. More specifically, we achieve a precision of 0.71 and a recall
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Figure 4: Multi-Prime+Probe attack on password input.
Keystrokes cause higher activity in more cache sets.
of 0.92, resulting in an F-score of 0.81, which is significantly better
than state-of-the-art Prime+Probe attacks.
3.3 Requirements for Effective Elimination of
Keystroke Timing Attacks
As demonstrated in the previous section, we are able to craft new at-
tacks with fewer requirements than state-of-the-art attacks. Hence,
countermeasures against keystroke timing attacks must be designed
in a generic way, in all affected layers of the software stack, covering
known and unknown attacks.
Attack Model. We assume an attacker can run an unprivileged
program on the target machine. The attacker is thus able to contin-
uously run a side-channel attack and obtain traces for all user input.
We assume the countermeasure was already installed when the
attacker gained unprivileged access to the machine. Consequently,
the attacker cannot obtain keystroke timing templates and thus
cannot perform a template attack.
We assume an attacker can generally obtain only a single trace
for any user input sequence, but multiple traces for password input.
In contrast to side-channel attacks on algorithms, which can be
repeated multiple times, user input sequences are generally not (au-
tomatically) repeatable and thus an attacker cannot obtain multiple
traces. An exception are phrases that are repeatedly entered in the
same way, such as login credentials and especially passwords. A
countermeasure must address both cases.
To effectively eliminate keystroke timing attacks, we identify
the three following requirements a countermeasure must fulfill.
R1: Minimize Side Channel Accuracy. As user input sequences are
in general not (automatically) repeatable, keystroke timing attacks
require a high precision and high recall to succeed. To be effective, a
countermeasuremust reduce the F-score enough so that the attacker
does not gain any advantage from using the side channel over an
always-one oracle. More specifically, the F-score of the side-channel
based classifier may not be above the F-score of the always-one
oracle (0.15). Ristenpart et al. [39] reported a false-negative rate of
5 % with 0.3 false positives per second. At an average typing speed
for a skilled typist of 8 keystrokes per second [37], the F-score
is thus 0.96, which is an advantage over an always-one oracle of
+545.3 %. Gruss et al. [14, 15] reported false-negative rates ≤ 8 %
with no false positives, resulting in an F-score of > 0.96, which
is an advantage over an always-one oracle of +546.9 %. Thus, we
assume a countermeasure is effective if it reduces the F-score of
side channels significantly, such that using the side channel gives
an advantage over an always-one oracle of ≤0.0 %.
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Figure 5: Multi-layered design of KeyDrown.
R2: Reduction of Statistical Characteristics in Password Input. In
case of a password input, we assume that an attacker can combine
information from multiple traces, i.e., exploit statistical character-
istics. A countermeasure is effective if the attacker requires an
impractical number of traces to reach the F-score of state-of-the-art
attacks, i.e., higher than 0.95.
Specifically, if the side-channel attack requires more traces than
can be practically obtained, we consider the side-channel attack
not practical. Studies [8, 9, 11, 40, 48] estimate that most users have
1–5 different passwords and enter 5 passwords per day on average.
It is also estimated that 56% of users change their password at least
once every 6 months. Thus, even if we assume that we attack a
user with a single password that is entered 5 times per day, the
expected number of measurement traces that an attacker is able to
gather after 6 months is 913. Assuming that attackers might come
up with new side-channel attacks, a generous security margin must
be applied. We consider a countermeasure effective if it requires
more than 1825 traces, i.e., traces for a whole year, to reach an
F-score of 0.95.
R3: Implementation Security. R1 and R2 define how the counter-
measure must be designed to be effective. However, the implemen-
tation itself can indirectly violate R1 or R2 by leaking side-channel
information on computations of the countermeasure itself. Conse-
quently, an attackermay be able to filter the true positive keystrokes.
We thus require that the countermeasure may not have distinguish-
able code paths or data access patterns to guarantee that it is free
from leakage.
If the implementation does not leak by itself, an attacker is only
left with the low F-scores from R1 and R2. If all requirements are
met, classical password recovery attacks like brute force and more
sophisticated attacks using Markov n-grams [27, 32], probabilistic
context-free grammars (PCFG) [46, 49], or neural networks [30],
are more practical than a side-channel attack in the presence of the
countermeasure.
In the following section we describe the design of a countermea-
sure that fulfills all three requirements.
Hook IRQStart timer
Eventis real? Inject IRQ
Inject timer interrupt
Randomly delay ISR
Fetch IRQ handler
Send eventRestart timer
TimerIRQ
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Figure 6: General flowchart of the kernel module.
4 KEYDROWN MULTI-LAYER DESIGN
We designed KeyDrown as a multi-layered countermeasure.2 Each
layer builds up on the layer beneath and adds additional protection.
Figure 5 shows how the layers are connected to each other. The first
layer implements a protection mechanism against interrupt-based
attacks and timing-based attacks by artificially injecting interrupts.
The injected interrupts mimic user behavior to hide the real inter-
rupt within a multitude of fake interrupts. All keystrokes, i.e., real
keystrokes and fake keystrokes, are passed to the library in a way
which is indistinguishable for an attacker. The second layer protects
the library handling the user input against Flush+Reload attacks,
including cache template attacks, and Prime+Probe attacks. For ev-
ery keystroke event received from the kernel, a random keystroke
is sent to a hidden window. The library cannot distinguish between
real and fake keystrokes and thus both have the same execution
path. In the third layer, the actual password entry field is protected
against Prime+Probe attacks by accessing the underlying buffer
whenever a real or a fake keystroke is received.
4.1 First Layer
Basic Concept. Figure 6 shows the program flow for the kernel
part of KeyDrown for both x86 and ARM. We use recurrent timer
interrupts with random delays to inject fake keystrokes. Note that
this leads to a uniform random distribution of keystrokes over time.
The kernel module handles two types of events, namely hardware
interrupts from the input device, and the recurrent timer inter-
rupt. If the kernel module receives a timer interrupt, it injects a
keyboard interrupt. If it receives a keyboard interrupt, it injects a
timer interrupt. Thus, for real and fake keystrokes both interrupts
occur. To minimize the effect of the real keyboard interrupt on the
interrupt density, the next recurrent timer interrupt is rescheduled
with a random delay. This guarantees that overall, the keystroke
interrupt density remains uniform and real keystrokes cannot be
distinguished from fake keystrokes.
For the fake keystrokes, the kernel uses a typically unused key
value. The kernel does not have varying code paths and data ac-
cesses based on the key value, hence, the same code is executed for
both real and fake keystrokes. In both cases, the keystroke handler
2The KeyDrown project is open-source and is available on GitHub:
https://github.com/keydrown/keydrown.
KeyDrown: Eliminating Keystroke Timing Side-Channel Attacks Pre-print, arXiv, 2017
do_IRQ() handle_irq()
generic_handle_\
irq_desc()
handle_irq()
IRQ 0x31 / 362
handle_irq()
IRQ n
...
i8042_interrupt()
irq_touch_handler()
Hook
serio_interrupt()
input_*()
KeyDrown
fetch
INT 0x31
msmgpio
interrupt 5
Figure 7: Linux kernel module design for x86 and the Snap-
dragon SoC. Snapdragon specific functions are marked in
blue.
is delayed by a small random delay to hide timing differences from
interrupt runtimes. Finally, all keystrokes are passed to the library
through the same data structures (cf. Figure 5). Consequently, the
attacker cannot use a Prime+Probe or Multi-Prime+Probe attack
on the kernel to distinguish real and fake keystrokes.
Implementation Details. The first layer of KeyDrown is imple-
mented as a Linux kernel module that aims to prevent interrupt-
based attacks on keystrokes. We do not require a custom kernel
or any patches to the Linux kernel itself. All functionality is im-
plemented in one generic kernel module that can be loaded into
any Linux kernel from version 3.4 to 4.10, the newest release at the
time of writing. The interrupt hardware and handling mechanism
is compatible with all personal computers, thus there is no further
limitation on PC hardware or Linux distributions.
Figure 7 shows the implementation details of the KeyDrown ker-
nel module. The recurrent timer interrupts are implemented using
the Linux platform-independent high-resolution timer API [26].
On Linux, a driver can register an interrupt handler for a specific
interrupt which is called whenever the CPU receives the interrupt.
The interrupt service routine do_IRQ calls the general handle_irq
function which subsequently calls generic_handle_irq_desc to
execute the correct handler for every interrupt. To receive all hard-
ware interrupts, we change the input device’s interrupt handler to
a function within our kernel module. Afterwards we forward the
interrupt to the actual input device driver (i.e., i8042_interrupt
on x86, and irq_touch_handler on the Nexus 5). Every time the
kernel receives a recurrent timer interrupt or a real hardware inter-
rupt, we restart the recurrent timer with a new random delay to
maintain the uniform random distribution over time.
The kernel module triggers a hardware interrupt for every re-
current timer interrupt. On x86, we can simply execute the int
assembly instruction with the corresponding interrupt number.
This spurious keyboard interrupt travels up until the point where
the keyboard driver tries to read the scancode from the hardware.
As the driver does not execute the entire i8042_interrupt func-
tion for spurious interrupts, we access the remaining function to
fetch it into the cache as if it was executed. In contrast, for real keys
we access the code that injects the keys to fetch it into the cache
as if it was executed. From an attacker’s point of view, there is no
difference in cache activity between a data fetch and a code fetch,
i.e., a Prime+Probe attack cannot determine the difference.
We inject a scancode of a typically unused key, such as F16 or
a Windows multimedia key using the standard serio_interrupt
interface. Thus, from this point on the only difference between real
and fake keystrokes is the scancode. Finally, all scancodes are sent
to the upper software layers and run through the same execution
path.
On the ARM platform, hardware interrupts and device drivers
are hardware dependent. We decided to implement our proof-of-
concept on the widespread Qualcomm Snapdragon Mobile Station
Modem (MSM) SoC [38].
ARM processors generally do not provide an assembly instruc-
tion to generate arbitrary interrupts from supervisor mode. Instead,
we have to communicate with the interrupt controller directly. The
Snapdragon MSM SoC implements its own intermediate I/O in-
terrupt controller. All interrupt generating hardware elements are
connected to this interrupt controller and not directly to the GIC.
Therefore, if we want to inject an interrupt, we write the interrupt
state of the touchscreen interrupt via memory mapped I/O registers
to the MSM I/O interrupt controller. The remaining execution path
is analogous to the x86 module. When the driver aborts due to a
spurious interrupt, we fetch the irq_touch_handler to produce
the same cache footprint as if it is executed. We inject an out-of-
bounds touch event using the input_event, input_report_abs,
and input_sync functions, which is then handed to the upper lay-
ers.
4.2 Second Layer
Basic Concept. The second layer countermeasure ensures that
the control flow within the key-handling library is exactly the same
for both real and injected keystrokes. The fundamental idea of the
second layer is that real and injected keystrokes should have the
same code paths and data accesses in the library. We rely on the
events injected in the first layer to propagate them further through
the key-handling library. The injected keys sent by our first layer
are valid, but typically unused keys, thus they travel all the way
up to the user space and are received by the userspace application.
However, these unused keys might not have the exact same path
within the library.
Gruss et al. showed that an attacker can build cache template
attacks based on Flush+Reload [15] to detect keystrokes and even
distinguish groups of keys. This cache leakage can also be measured
with Multi-Prime+Probe. Both attacks exploit the cache activity
of certain functions that are only called if a keystroke is handled,
i.e., varying execution paths and access patterns [15]. We mitigate
these attacks by duplicating every key event (cf. Figure 5) running
through multiple execution paths and access sequences simultane-
ously. The key value of the duplicated key event is replaced by a
random key value and the key event is sent to a hidden window.
Hence, the two key events, the real and the duplicated one, are
processed simultaneously by the remainder of the library and the
two applications. This introduces a significant amount of noise on
cache template attacks on the library layer.
The real key event at this point may still be a fake keystroke
from the kernel. However, we duplicate the key event in order to
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trigger key value processing and key drawing in the library and the
hidden window for both fake and real keystrokes. Consequently,
we cannot distinguish real and fake keystrokes on the library layer
using a side channel anymore.
Implementation Details. One of the most popular user interface
libraries for Linux is GTK+ [50]. The GTK+ library handles the user
input for many desktop environments and is thus included in most
Linux distributions [45]. As we cannot hide cache activity, we have
to generate artificial cache activity for the same cache lines that
are active when handling real user inputs.
The kernel provides all events, such as keyboard inputs, through
the /dev/input/event* pseudo-files to the user space. The XWin-
dow System uses these files to provide all events to the GTK+ event
queue.
On x86, the second layer is a standalone GTK+ application. On
system startup, we create a hidden window containing a text field.
The application uses poll to listen to the /dev/input/event* in-
terface to get notified whenever a keyboard event occurs. This
allows KeyDrown to have a very low performance overhead, as the
application is not using CPU time as long as it is waiting inside
the poll function. Whenever we receive a keystroke event from
the kernel, we create an additional GTK+ keystroke event with a
random key that is associated with the text field of the hidden win-
dow. For every keystroke — regardless of whether it is a printable
character or not — that comes from the kernel, the same path is
active within the library. Thus, an attacker cannot distinguish an
injected keystroke from a real keystroke anymore.
The second layer has no knowledge of an event’s source. Thus,
it cannot violate R3, as the information whether a keystroke is real
or injected is not present within the second layer.
On Android, the handling of input events is considerably simpler.
The injected events travel directly to the foreground application
without going to any non-Android library. Thus, all events have
exactly the same execution path and it is only necessary to drop our
fake event immediately before the registered touch event handler
is called. To not leak any information through the non-executed
touch handler, we access the cache lines in the same way as if the
touch handler was executed.
4.3 Third Layer
Basic Concept. While the first layer protects against interrupt-
based attacks and the second layer prevents attacks on the library
handling the user inputs, the buffer that stores the actual secret
is not protected and can still be monitored using a Prime+Probe
attack. The fake keystrokes sent by the kernel are unused key codes,
which do not have any effect on the user interface element or the
corresponding buffer. We mitigate cache attacks on this layer by
generating cache activity on the cache lines that are used when the
buffer is processed for any key code received from the kernel. More
specifically, we access the buffer every time the library receives
a keystroke event from the kernel. This ensures that the buffer is
cached for both real and fake keystrokes.
An attacker who mounts a Flush+Reload attack against the li-
brary, or a Prime+Probe attack directly on the buffer, sees cache
activity for both real and injected events. This is also the case
for cache template attacks, as the injected events induce a signif-
icant amount of noise in both the profiling and the exploitation
phase. Therefore, the third layer protects against attacks that are
mounted against the Android keyboard as shown by Lipp et al.
[24], or Multi-Prime+Probe attacks directly on the input field buffer
(cf. Section 3.2).
Implementation Details. In GTK+ the GtkEntry widget is used
as a single-line text and password entry field. By setting its visi-
bility flag, entered characters are replaced by a symbol and, thus,
hidden from the viewer. The GtkEntry widget implements the
GtkEditable interface that describes a text-editing widget.
Implementing the countermeasure directly in the GTK+ library
would require to rebuild the library and all of its dependencies. As
this is highly impractical, we chose a different approach: LD_PRELOAD
allows listing shared objects that are loaded before other shared
objects on execution of the program [1]. By using this environ-
ment variable, we can overwrite the gtk_entry_new function that
is called when a new object of GtkEntry should be created. In our
own implementation, we register a key press event handler for
the new entry field. This event handler is called on both real and
injected keys and accesses the underlying buffer.
On Android, the basic concept is the same. It is, however, imple-
mented as part of the keyboard and not the library. The keyboard
relies on the inotifyd command to detect touch events provided
by the kernel. If a password entry field is focused, the keyboard
accesses the password entry buffer on every touch event by calling
the key handling function with a dummy key. This ensures that
both the buffer as well as the keyboard’s key handling functions
are active for every event.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluate KeyDrown with respect to the requirements R1, R2,
R3 as well as discuss the performance of our implementation. We
evaluate the x86 version of KeyDrown on a Lenovo ThinkPad T460s
with an Intel Core i5-6200U and the ARM version on both an LG
Nexus 5 (ARMv7) and a OnePlus 3T (ARMv8). A large comparison
table can be found in Appendix A. As the results are very similar for
all architectures we provide the results for the LG Nexus 5 (ARMv7)
in Appendix B and for the OnePlus 3T (ARMv8) in Appendix C. We
evaluate four different side channels with and without KeyDrown:
procfs, rdtsc, Flush+Reload (including cache template attacks),
and Prime+Probe on the last-level cache. We also discuss Prime+
Probe attacks on the L1 cache and DRAMA side-channel attacks.
To evaluateKeyDrown, we chose a uniform key-injection interval
[0ms, 20ms] resulting in one event (either a real or an injected
keystroke) every 10ms on average. Thus, on average we expect 100
events per second.
As described in Section 3, we compare our results to an always-
one oracle and a random-guessing oracle. A random-guessing ora-
cle, which chooses randomly—without any information—for every
10ms interval whether there was a keystroke based on an apriori
probability, would achieve an F-score of 0.14. The always-one or-
acle performs slightly better, as it has a higher true positive rate
of 100 %, but it also has a false positive rate of 100 %, i.e., the ora-
cle neither uses nor provides any information. The F-score of the
always-one oracle is 0.15 and thus, higher than the F-score of a
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Table 2: F-score without and with KeyDrown and advan-
tage over always-one oracle for state-of-the-art attacks.
KeyDrown eliminates any side-channel advantage.
Side Channel no KeyDrown (∆ always-one) KeyDrown (∆ always-one)
procfs 1.00 (+575.0 %) 0.15 (+0.0 %)
rdtsc 0.94 (+537.4 %) 0.14 (−3.8 %)
Flush+Reload 0.99 (+569.3 %) 0.09 (−40.2 %)
LLC Prime+Probe 0.81 (+440.0 %) 0.11 (−27.7 %)
random-guessing oracle. If a side channel yields an F-score of this
value or below, the attacker gains no advantage over the always-one
oracle from this side channel.
For all evaluated attacks, we provide the precision of the attack
with and without KeyDrown, based on the best threshold distin-
guisher we can find. KeyDrown does not influence the recall, as it
does not reduce the number of true positives and it also does not
increase the number of real keystrokes. However, we provide the
recall for all attacks with a recall below 1. The harmonic mean of
precision and recall—the F-score—gives an indication how well the
countermeasure works. We provide the advantage over the always-
one oracle as a direct indicator on whether it makes sense to use
the side channel or not.
5.1 Requirement R1
We evaluate KeyDrown with respect to R1, the elimination of single-
trace attacks. R1 defines that a side channel may not provide any
advantage over an always-one oracle, i.e., the advantage measured
in the F-score must be ≤0.0 %. We show that KeyDrown fulfills this
requirement by mounting state-of-the-art attacks with and without
KeyDrown. Table 2 summarizes the F-scores for all attacks with and
without KeyDrown. In all cases, KeyDrown eliminates any advantage
that can be gained from the side channel, when considering single-
trace attacks only. In some cases, the numerous false positives and
false negatives lead to an even worse F-score.
Flush+Reload. Flush+Reload allows an attacker to monitor ac-
cesses to memory addresses of a shared library with a very high
accuracy. Figure 8 shows the result of such an attack against the
gdk_keymap_get_modifier_mask function at address 0x381c0 of
libgdk-3.so (v3.20.4 on Ubuntu Linux), the shared library isolating
GTK+ from the windowing system. This function is executed on
every keystroke to retrieve the hardware modifier mask of the
windowing system.
Figure 8a shows the attack when the countermeasure is inactive.
The attacker measures cache hits on the monitored address when-
ever a key is pressed and, thus, can spy on the keystroke timings
very accurately. If KeyDrown is active, as illustrated in Figure 8b,
the attacker measures additional cache hits on every injected key-
stroke and cannot distinguish between them. For other addresses
found using cache template attacks, we made the same observation.
Without KeyDrown, both profiling and exploiting vulnerable ad-
dresses is possible. With KeyDrown, we still find all addresses that
are loaded into the cache upon keystrokes, however, as we cannot
distinguish between real and fake keystrokes we cannot exploit this
anymore. Without KeyDrown, the precision is 1.00 and the F-score
is 0.99, which is a +569.3 % advantage over an always-one oracle. If
KeyDrown is active, the precision is lowered to 0.05 and, thus, the
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Figure 8: Flush+Reload attack on address 0x381c0 of
libgdk-3.so. (a) The attack allows to clearly detect every sin-
gle keystroke (•). (b) With KeyDrown, the attacker measures
cache hits on injected keystrokes (▲) aswell as on real events
(•) and cannot distinguish between them.
resulting F-score is 0.09, which is a (negative) advantage of −40.2 %
over the always-one oracle.
Prime+Probe. If an attacker cannot use Flush+Reload, a fallback
to Prime+Probe is possible. The disadvantage of a Prime+Probe
attack on the last-level cache is the amount of noise that increases
the false-positive rate. Prior to this work, there was no successful
keystroke attack using Prime+Probe on the last-level cache. We
perform the Multi-Prime+Probe attack presented in Section 3.2 to
attack keystroke timings.
Figure 9 shows the results of inferring keystrokes by detecting
the keyboard interrupt handler’s cache activity using Multi-Prime+
Probe. We monitored 5 cache sets in parallel for a higher noise
robustness. Without KeyDrown, the precision is already at a quite
low value of 0.71 with a recall of only 0.92, yielding an F-score of
0.81, which is an advantage over an always-one oracle of +440.0 %.
Memory accesses to one of the cache sets by any other application
cannot be distinguished from a cache set access by the keyboard
interrupt handler, causing a high number of false positives. If we
enable KeyDrown, the precision drops to 0.06, as the attacker addi-
tionally measures the noise generated by the injected keystrokes.
The F-score is then 0.11, which is a (negative) advantage over an
always-one oracle of -27.7 %.
Figure 10 shows the results of mounting a Multi-Prime+Probe
attack on the buffer of a password field within a GTK+ application.
Although there is more noise visible in the traces, we achieve the
same precision and F-score as for the attack on the kernel module
when KeyDrown is disabled. If we enable KeyDrown, the precision
drops to 0.05, which is a bit lower than the precision on the kernel,
resulting in an F-score of 0.10, which is again no advantage over
an always-one oracle.
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Figure 9: Multi-Prime+Probe attack on the 5 cache sets from
0x2514250 to 0x2514390 of i8042_interrupt. (a) Noise nega-
tively affects the detection of single keystrokes (•). (b) With
KeyDrown, the attacker measures even more cache misses
on injected keystrokes (▲) as well as on real events (•) and
cannot distinguish between them.
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Figure 10: Multi-Prime+Probe attack on the 5 cache sets cor-
responding to a password field’s buffer within a demo ap-
plication. (a) Noise negatively affects the detection of single
keystrokes (•). (b) With KeyDrown, the attacker measures
even more cache misses on injected keystrokes (▲) as well
as on real events (•) and cannot distinguish between them.
Interrupts. KeyDrown also protects against interrupt-based at-
tacks, including our new timing-based attack. For the attacks based
on the procfs interface [10, 21], we measure an average reading
interval of 980 cycles. With our new attack based on rdtsc, we are
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Figure 11: procfs-based attack. (a) The attack allows to
clearly detect every single keyboard interrupt (•). (b) With
KeyDrown, the attacker measures fake interrupts (▲) as well
as real interrupts (•) and cannot distinguish between them.
able to measure every 95 cycles on average, resulting in a probing
frequency that is one order of magnitude higher.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 illustrate the effect of our countermeasure
on the procfs-based interrupt attack and the rdtsc-based attack,
respectively. Without KeyDrown, we achieve a precision of 1.00 for
the procfs-based attack and a precision of 0.89 for the rdtsc-based
attack, resulting in an F-score of 1.00 and 0.94 respectively. Enabling
KeyDrown reduces the precision to 0.08 and 0.07 respectively. Thus,
the resulting F-score is 0.15, which is exactly the same as the always-
one oracle, for the procfs-based attack, and 0.14 for the rdtsc-
based attack, which is a (negative) advantage over an always-one
oracle of -3.8 %.
5.2 Requirement R2
KeyDrown reduced the F-score of all state-of-the-art attacks such
that using the side channel gives an advantage over an always-
one oracle of ≤0.0 %. An attacker might still be able to combine
multiple traces from the same user and build a binary classifier,
if the user predictably and repeatedly types the same character
sequence. Such a classifier may achieve a higher precision and a
higher F-score, as long as there is actually meaningful information
in the corresponding traces. However, there is a practical limit on
the number of traces an attacker can gather from the user, which
R2 estimates to be 1825 traces.
In our attack scenario, we model a powerful attacker who can
take advantage of the following properties:
(1) Noise-free side channel: The used side channel is noise-
free, i.e., only real and fake keystrokes are recorded, no
other system noise.
(2) Perfect (re-)alignment: The attacker can detect when
a password input starts with a variance as low as the
variance of a single inter-keystroke interval. Additionally,
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(b) With KeyDrown.
Figure 12: rdtsc-based attack. (a) The attack allows to
clearly detect every single keyboard interrupt (•). (b) With
KeyDrown, the attacker measures fake interrupts (▲) as well
as real interrupts (•) and cannot distinguish between them.
the attacker has an alignment-oracle providing perfect re-
alignment for the traces after each guessed keystroke. This
leads to the same variance for every key instead of an
accumulated variance.
(3) Known length: The attacker knows the exact length of
the password and expects exactly as many keystrokes.
This attacker is far stronger than any practical attacker.
We generate simulated traces that fulfill the properties above
and calculate the average of the perfectly (re-)aligned traces. As
our attacker knows the length n of the password, he finds the n
most likely positions where a Gaussian distribution with the known
inter-keystroke interval variance matches. If the expected value µ
of each Gaussian curve is within the variance of the real keystroke,
we assume that the number of traces was sufficient to extract the
positions of the real keystrokes.
We set the simulated typing variance to±40mswhich is a bit less
than the value reported by Lee et al. [23] for trained text sequences.
In total, we generated 300 000 simulated traces, each containing 8
keystrokes within 2 s. From this set of simulated traces, we eval-
uated how many randomly chosen traces we have to combine to
extract the correct positions of the keystrokes. We found that an
attacker requires an average of 2458 traces to extract the correct
positions. This is significantly more than the 1825 traces deemed
to be secure in requirement R2.
5.3 Requirement R3
As KeyDrown fulfills R1 and R2, we can be assured that the un-
derlying technique is a working countermeasure. However, as the
implementation of a countermeasure itself can leak information,
we need to make sure that KeyDrown does not create a new (mi-
croarchitectural) side channel in order to satisfy R3.
First Layer. The first layer runs in the kernel and can thus only
be attacked using Prime+Probe. Figure 7 shows that, in general, we
have the same execution flow and data accesses. For the few devia-
tions, we prevent any potential cache leakage from non-executed
code paths by performing the same memory accesses as if they
were executed. As an attacker cannot distinguish if a cache ac-
tivity is caused by an execution or a memory read, the module’s
cache activity does not leak additional information to an attacker.
We investigated the cache activity on the cache sets used by the
KeyDrown kernel module in a Prime+Probe attack and found no
leakage from our module.
Second Layer. To make use of the same noise as in the first layer,
the second layer listens to the /dev/input/event0 pseudo-file
containing all keyboard events. This file is not world-readable but
only readable by users part of the input user group. Thus, this layer
runs under a separate keydrown user with default limited privileges
and additional access to this file.
As the second layer is a user space binary, an attacker could
theoretically mount a Flush+Reload attack against the second layer.
However, attacking the second layer does not result in any addi-
tional information. The second layer does not know whether an
event is generated from a real or an injected keystroke. For every
event, a random printable character is sent to the hidden window.
Thus, the execution path for printable characters is always active
and the attacker cannot learn any additional information from at-
tacking the second layer. The same is also true for Prime+Probe,
even a successful attack does not provide additional information.
We investigated the cache activity of the KeyDrown shared library
parts and the KeyDrown user space binary using a template attack
and did not find any leakage.
Third Layer. The third layer builds upon the second layer, and
thus the same argumentation as for the second layer holds. An
attacker cannot distinguish real and injected keystrokes in the
second layer as all events are merged within the kernel. As the
third layer relies on the same source as the second layer, there
is also no leakage from the third layer. Thus, any attack on the
third layer does not give an attacker any advantage over any other
attack. We investigated the cache activity of the control flow and
data accesses up to the point where the input is stored in the buffer
in a Prime+Probe attack and found no leakage.
5.4 Performance
On the x86 architecture, we evaluate the performance impacts of
running our KeyDrown implementation on standard Ubuntu 16.10.
We use lmbench [29], a set of micro benchmarks for performance
analysis of UNIX systems, and PARSEC 3.0 [5], a benchmark suite
intended to simulate a realistic workload on multicore systems.
The lmbench results for the latency benchmarks show a perfor-
mance overhead of 6.9 %. However, as the execution time of the
lmbench benchmarks is in the range of microseconds to nanosec-
onds, the overhead does not allow for definite conclusions about
the overall system performance. Still, we can see that the injected
interrupts have only a small impact on the kernel performance.
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To measure the overall performance, we run the PARSEC 3.0
benchmark with different numbers of cores. The average perfor-
mance overhead over all measurements for any number of cores
is 2.5 %. For workloads that do not use all cores, the performance
impact is only 2.0 % for one core and 2.5 % for two cores. Only if
the CPU is under heavy load, we observe a higher performance
impact of 3.1 % when running the benchmarks on all cores.
On ARM, we evaluate the battery consumption of KeyDrown.
We measure the power consumption in three different scenarios,
always over the timespan of 5min. First, if the screen is off, our fake
interrupts are completely disabled, and thus, KeyDrown does not
increase the power consumption if the mobile phone is not used.
Second, if the screen is turned on, but the keyboard is not shown.
In this case, KeyDrown increases the power consumption slightly
by 3.9 %. Third, if the keyboard is shown, the power consumption
with KeyDrown increases by 15.6 %. However, as most of the time
the keyboard is not shown, KeyDrown does not have great impacts
on the overall power consumption.
Note that all the performance measurements were done using
the proof-of-concept. We expect that the proof-of-concept can be
considerably improved in terms of performance overhead and bat-
tery usage by not injecting the fake interrupts all the time but only
while the user is actually entering text.
5.5 Other Attacks
Whilewe already demonstrated that themost powerful side-channel
attacks are mitigated, we discuss three other attacks subsequently.
The Prime+Probe side channel results from the victim program
evicting a cache line of the attacker. As the last-level cache is inclu-
sive, any eviction from the last-level cache also evicts this line from
the L1 cache. However, if a cache line is evicted from the L1 cache
it may still be in the last-level cache. In this case the attacker would
miss the eviction and thus the targeted event. In our evaluation we
find that the recall is very close to 1 in all cases. This means that
we do not miss any events. Hence, there is no additional informa-
tion that an attacker could gain from a Prime+Probe attack on the
L1 cache. Consequently, evaluating Prime+Probe on the last-level
cache is sufficient to conclude that Prime+Probe on the L1 cache
does not leak additional information.
The DRAMA side-channel attack presented by Pessl et al. [36] re-
sults from a massive number of secret-dependent memory accesses
that lead to heavy cache thrashing, i.e., the victim program accesses
lots of memory locations that are mapped to the same cache lines.
It is therefore unclear whether or not KeyDrown protects against
DRAMA. In particular, it does not protect against the specific attack
against keystrokes in the Firefox address bar (cf. Section 6).
Vila et al. [47] showed a keystroke timing attack based on the
event queue of the Chrome browser. They state that the leakage
is due to the time it takes Chrome to enqueue and dispatch every
keystroke event. Thus, this attack is also out-of-scope (cf. Section 6)
for KeyDrown. Surprisingly, we noticed that KeyDrown adds mea-
surable noise to their attack, which makes it difficult to see the
real keystroke timings. Thus, we concluded that the authors do
not only detect timing differences in the event queue, but also see
hardware interrupts. To confirm our hypothesis, we tested their at-
tack on Firefox, where it—to a lesser extent—also works, and where
KeyDrown was able to fully prevent it.
6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
KeyDrown mitigates interrupt-based attacks as well as microarchi-
tectural attacks on keystrokes and keystroke timings in general.
This includes even the application layer without changing an exist-
ing application if either:
• the input is processed only after the user finished entering the
text, e.g., by pressing a button on a login form, and there is no
immediate action when a key is pressed, e.g., as it is the case
in password fields or simple text input fields,
• the application is designed to remove side-channel information.
However, KeyDrown does not prevent all possible side-channel at-
tacks on keyboard input. Depending on the implementation of the
application, the application layer might still leak timing information.
Examples include but are not limited to:
• key press/release handlers reacting on every keystroke and
executing code which might be detected due to CPU utiliza-
tion [21], network traffic [53], or screen redraws [10],
• operations that are executed after every text update, such as
e.g., autocomplete or live search features [36].
Other side-channel information may allow inferring keyboard
input directly. For instance, various sensors like the accelerome-
ter [7] have been successfully exploited to infer keyboard input
on mobile devices. While such specific attacks can be thwarted by
restricting access to specific resources and by injecting noise in the
sensor values [41], we consider these attacks out of scope in this
paper.
We demonstrate KeyDrown protection against interrupt-based
attacks and microarchitectural attacks on keystrokes as well as
touch events. However, swipe movements are not protected as their
interrupt rate is too high. While this is not a problem in the case of a
password input—if a password can be swiped and thus pasted from
a dictionary, there is little to protect—it is future work to investigate
how to extend KeyDrown to protect swipe movements in general.
Furthermore, our novel side channels emphasize the necessity
to deploy KeyDrown widely. Multi-Prime+Probe attacks provide a
significantly higher accuracy than previous Prime+Probe attacks
on dynamic memory and kernel memory. It is likely that Multi-
Prime+Probe works similarly in cloud systems and thus allows
highly accurate attacks like keystroke timing attacks across virtual
machine boundaries.
7 CONCLUSION
Keystrokes are processed on many different layers of the software
stack and are thus not entirely covered by previously proposed
defense mechanisms. In this article we presented KeyDrown, a
novel defense mechanism that mitigates keystroke timing attacks.
KeyDrown injects a larger number of fake keystrokes on the ker-
nel level and propagates them—through all layers of the software
stack—up to the user space application. A careful design and imple-
mentation of this countermeasure ensures that all software routines
involved in the processing of a keystroke are loaded, irrespective of
whether a real or a fake keystroke is processed. Thereby, KeyDrown
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mitigates interrupt-based attacks, Prime+Probe attacks, and Flush+
Reload attacks on the entire software stack. With KeyDrown, an
attacker cannot distinguish fake from real keystrokes in practice
anymore. Our evaluation shows that KeyDrown eliminates any
advantage an attacker can gain from side channels, i.e., ≤0.0 % ad-
vantage over an always-one oracle, and thus successfully mitigates
keystroke timing attacks.
REFERENCES
[1] 2016. ld.so(8) Linux Programmer’s Manual.
[2] ARM. 2007. Application Note 176 – How a GIC works. http://infocenter.arm.
com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.dai0176c/ar01s03s02.html. (2007).
[3] ARM. 2013. ARM Generic Interrupt Controller Architecture version 2.0. (2013).
[4] Daniel J. Bernstein. 2005. Cache-Timing Attacks on AES. Technical Report.
Department of Mathematics, Statistics, and Computer Science, University of
Illinois at Chicago. http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf.
[5] Christian Bienia, Sanjeev Kumar, Jaswinder Pal Singh, and Kai Li. 2008. The
PARSEC benchmark suite: Characterization and architectural implications. In
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Parallel architectures and com-
pilation techniques.
[6] Daniel P Bovet and Marco Cesati. 2005. Understanding the Linux Kernel. O’Reilly
Media, Inc.
[7] Liang Cai and Hao Chen. 2011. TouchLogger: Inferring Keystrokes on Touch
Screen from Smartphone Motion. In USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security
– HotSec. USENIX Association.
[8] CSID. 2012. Consumer Survey: Password Habits. http://www.csid.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CS_PasswordSurvey_FullReport_FINAL.pdf.
(2012).
[9] Anupam Das, Joseph Bonneau, Matthew Caesar, Nikita Borisov, and Xiaofeng
Wang. 2014. The Tangled Web of Password Reuse. (2014).
[10] Wenrui Diao, Xiangyu Liu, Zhou Li, and Kehuan Zhang. 2016. No Pardon for
the Interruption: New Inference Attacks on Android Through Interrupt Timing
Analysis. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy – SP. IEEE Computer Society,
414–432.
[11] Shirley Gaw and Edward W. Felten. 2006. Password Management Strategies for
Online Accounts. In SOUPS ’06.
[12] Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock, and Gernot Heiser. 2016. A Survey of
Microarchitectural Timing Attacks and Countermeasures on Contemporary
Hardware. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering (2016), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.
1007/s13389-016-0141-6
[13] Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Anders Fogh, Moritz Lipp, and Stefan Man-
gard. 2016. Prefetch Side-Channel Attacks: Bypassing SMAP and Kernel ASLR.
In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security – CCS. ACM,
368–379.
[14] Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Klaus Wagner, and Stefan Mangard. 2016.
Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack. In Detection of Intrusions and
Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment – DIMVA (LNCS), Vol. 9721. Springer,
279–299.
[15] Daniel Gruss, Raphael Spreitzer, and Stefan Mangard. 2015. Cache Template
Attacks: Automating Attacks on Inclusive Last-Level Caches. In USENIX Security
Symposium. USENIX Association, 897–912.
[16] David Gullasch, Endre Bangerter, and Stephan Krenn. 2011. Cache Games –
Bringing Access-Based Cache Attacks on AES to Practice. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy – S&P. IEEE Computer Society, 490–505.
[17] Syed Idrus, Estelle Cherrier, Christophe Rosenberger, and Patrick Bours. 2014.
Soft Biometrics for Keystroke Dynamics: Profiling Individuals While Typing
Passwords. Computers & Security 45 (2014).
[18] Mehmet Sinan Inci, Berk Gulmezoglu, Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, and
Berk Sunar. 2016. Cache Attacks Enable Bulk Key Recovery on the Cloud.
In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES (LNCS), Vol. 9813.
Springer, 368–388.
[19] Intel. 1996. 82093AA I/O Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (IOAPIC).
(1996).
[20] Intel. 2014. Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual,
Volume 3 (3A, 3B & 3C): System Programming Guide. 253665 (2014).
[21] Suman Jana and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2012. Memento: Learning Secrets from Process
Footprints. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy – SP. IEEE Computer
Society, 143–157.
[22] Yeongjin Jang, Sangho Lee, and Taesoo Kim. 2016. Breaking Kernel Address
Space Layout Randomization with Intel TSX. In ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security – CCS. ACM, 380–392.
[23] Po-Ming Lee, Wei-Hsuan Tsui, and Tzu-Chien Hsiao. 2015. The Influence of
Emotion on Keyboard Typing: An Experimental Study Using Auditory Stimuli.
PLOS ONE 10 (2015), 1–16.
[24] Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss, Raphael Spreitzer, Clémentine Maurice, and Stefan
Mangard. 2016. ARMageddon: Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices. In USENIX
Security Symposium. USENIX Association, 549–564.
[25] Fangfei Liu, Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Gernot Heiser, and Ruby B. Lee. 2015. Last-
Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical. In IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy – SP. IEEE Computer Society, 605–622.
[26] LWN. 2006. The high-resolution timer API. https://lwn.net/Articles/167897/.
(Jan. 2006).
[27] Jerry Ma, Weining Yang, Min Luo, and Ninghui Li. 2014. A Study of Probabilistic
Password Models. In SP ’14.
[28] Clémentine Maurice, Nicolas Le Scouarnec, Christoph Neumann, Olivier Heen,
and Aurélien Francillon. 2015. Reverse Engineering Intel Complex Addressing
Using Performance Counters. In Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses –
RAID (LNCS), Vol. 9404. Springer, 48–65.
[29] Larry W McVoy, Carl Staelin, and others. 1996. lmbench: Portable Tools for
Performance Analysis.. In USENIX annual technical conference.
[30] William Melicher, Blase Ur, Sean M. Segreti, Saranga Komanduri, Lujo Bauer,
Nicolas Christin, and Lorrie Faith Cranor. 2016. Fast, Lean, and Accurate: Model-
ing Password Guessability Using Neural Networks. In USENIX Security Sympo-
sium. USENIX Association.
[31] Microsoft. 2016. ACPI system description tables. https://msdn.microsoft.com/
en-us/windows/hardware/drivers/bringup/acpi-system-description-tables#
madt. (July 2016).
[32] Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2005. Fast Dictionary Attacks on
Passwords Using Time-space Tradeoff. In CCS ’05.
[33] Yossef Oren, Vasileios P Kemerlis, Simha Sethumadhavan, and Angelos D
Keromytis. 2015. The Spy in the Sandbox: Practical Cache Attacks in JavaScript
and their Implications. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security – CCS. ACM, 1406–1418.
[34] Dag Arne Osvik, Adi Shamir, and Eran Tromer. 2006. Cache Attacks and Coun-
termeasures: the Case of AES. In Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA (LNCS), Vol. 3860.
Springer, 1–20.
[35] Colin Percival. 2005. Cache missing for fun and profit. In Proceedings of BSDCan.
[36] Peter Pessl, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Michael Schwarz, and Stefan
Mangard. 2016. DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks.
In USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX Association, 565–581.
[37] Svetlana Pinet, Johannes C. Ziegler, and F.-Xavier Alario. 2016. Typing Is Writing:
Linguistic Properties Modulate Typing Execution. Psychon Bull Rev 23, 6 (April
2016).
[38] Qualcomm. 2017. Snapdragon Mobile Processors and Chipsets. https://www.
qualcomm.com/products/snapdragon. (Jan. 2017).
[39] Thomas Ristenpart, Eran Tromer, Hovav Shacham, and Stefan Savage. 2009.
Hey, You, Get Off of My Cloud: Exploring Information Leakage in Third-Party
Compute Clouds. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
– CCS. ACM, 199–212.
[40] Richard Shay, Saranga Komanduri, Patrick Gage Kelley, Pedro Giovanni Leon,
Michelle L. Mazurek, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, and Lorrie Faith Cranor. 2010.
Encountering Stronger Password Requirements: User Attitudes and Behaviors.
In SOUPS ’10.
[41] Prakash Shrestha, Manar Mohamed, and Nitesh Saxena. 2016. Slogger: Smashing
Motion-based Touchstroke Logging with Transparent System Noise. In ACM
Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks – WISEC. ACM,
67–77.
[42] Laurent Simon,WenduanXu, and Ross Anderson. 2016. Don’t InterruptMeWhile
I Type: Inferring Text Entered Through Gesture Typing on Android Keyboards.
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2016, 3 (2016), 136–154.
[43] Dawn Xiaodong Song, DavidWagner, and Xuqing Tian. 2001. Timing Analysis of
Keystrokes and Timing Attacks on SSH. In USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX
Association.
[44] Raphael Spreitzer, Veelasha Moonsamy, Thomas Korak, and Stefan Mangard.
2016. Systematic Classification of Side-Channel Attacks: A Case Study for Mobile
Devices. arXiv:1611.03748 (2016).
[45] The GTK+Team. 2016. GTK+ Features. https://www.gtk.org/features.php. (2016).
[46] Raphael Veras, Christopher Collins, and Julie Thorpe. 2014. On Semantic Patterns
of Passwords and their Security Impact. In NDSS’14.
[47] Pepe Vila and Boris Köpf. 2017. Loophole: Timing Attacks on Shared Event
Loops in Chrome. In USENIX Security Symposium.
[48] Rick Wash, Rader Rader, Ruthie Berman, and Zac Wellmer. 2016. Understand-
ing Password Choices: How Frequently Entered Passwords Are Re-used across
Websites. In SOUPS’16.
[49] Matt Weir, Sudhir Aggarwal, Breno de Medeiros, and Bill Glodek. 2009. Password
Cracking Using Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars. In SP ’09.
[50] X.org Foundation. 2014. xorg Documentation. https://www.x.org/wiki/
Documentation/. (Oct. 2014).
[51] Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. 2014. Flush+Reload: a High Resolution, Low
Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel Attack. In USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX
Association, 719–732.
Pre-print, arXiv, 2017 M. Schwarz et al.
[52] Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Fangfei Liu, Ruby B. Lee, and Gernot Heiser. 2015. Map-
ping the Intel Last-Level Cache. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/905
(2015).
[53] Kehuan Zhang and XiaoFeng Wang. 2009. Peeping Tom in the Neighborhood:
Keystroke Eavesdropping onMulti-User Systems. In USENIX Security Symposium.
USENIX Association, 17–32.
A EFFECT OF KEYDROWN ON DIFFERENT
ARCHITECTURES
In this section, we compare the accuracy of four different side chan-
nels with and without KeyDrown: procfs, rdtsc, Flush+Reload,
and Prime+Probe on the last-level cache. We compare these attacks
on three different architectures: a Lenovo ThinkPad T460s with an
Intel Core i5-6200U, an LG Nexus 5 (ARMv7), and a OnePlus 3T
(ARMv8). Table 3 summarizes the F-scores for all attacks with and
without KeyDrown. KeyDrown prevents keystroke timing attacks in
all cases when considering single-trace attacks only.
B NEXUS 5
We performed our experiments on the touchscreen soft-keyboard of
theNexus 5. Figure 13 shows a Flush+Reload attack on libinput.so.
Without KeyDrown, the precision is 1.00 and the F-score is thus
0.99. If KeyDrown is active, the precision is lowered to 0.01 and,
thus, the resulting F-score of 0.02means a ≤−86.5 % advantage over
an always-one oracle.
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show a procfs-based interrupt attack
and a timing-based attack, both on the Nexus 5. Without KeyDrown,
we achieve a precision of 1.00 for the procfs-based attack and
a precision of 0.89 for the timing-based attack, resulting in an F-
score of 1.00 and 0.94 respectively. Enabling KeyDrown reduces the
precision to only 0.08 and 0.07 respectively. Thus, the resulting
F-score is 0.15 for the procfs-based attack, and 0.14 for the timing-
based attack, which is an advantage of ≤0.0 % over an always-one
oracle.
Figure 16 shows the results of inferring keystrokes by detecting
the touchscreen interrupt handler’s cache activity using Multi-
Prime+Probe on the Nexus 5. We monitored 5 cache sets in parallel
for a higher noise robustness. Without KeyDrown, the precision
is already at a quite low value of 0.71 with a recall of only 0.92,
as an access to one of the cache sets by any other application
cannot be distinguished from a cache set access by the touchscreen
interrupt handler. Thus, this attack has a high number of false
positives. If we enable KeyDrown, the precision drops to 0.06, as the
attacker additionally measures the noise generated by the injected
keystrokes. Thus, the F-score is 0.11.
C ONEPLUS 3T
We performed our experiments on the touchscreen soft-keyboard
of the OnePlus 3T. Figure 17 shows a Flush+Reload attack on
libflinger.so on the OnePlus 3T. Without KeyDrown, the preci-
sion is 0.88 and the F-score is thus 0.93. If KeyDrown is active, the
precision is lowered to 0.05 and, thus, the resulting F-score of 0.10
means a ≤−32.5 % advantage over an always-one oracle.
Figure 18 and Figure 19 show a procfs-based interrupt attack
as well as a timing-based attack, both on the OnePlus 3T. Without
KeyDrown, we achieve a precision of 1.00 for the procfs-based
attack and a precision of 0.99 for the timing-based attack, resulting
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Figure 13: Flush+Reload attack on address 0xfb5a of
libinput.so on the Nexus 5. (a) The attack allows to clearly
detect every single keystroke (•). (b) With KeyDrown, the at-
tackermeasures cachehits on injected keystrokes (▲) aswell
as on real events (•) and cannot distinguish between them.
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Figure 14: procfs-based attack on the Nexus 5. (a) The at-
tack allows to clearly detect every single touchscreen inter-
rupt (•). (b) With KeyDrown, the attacker measures fake in-
terrupts (▲) as well as real interrupts (•) and cannot distin-
guish between them.
in an F-score of 1.00 and 0.99 respectively. Enabling KeyDrown
reduces the precision to only 0.08 and 0.07 respectively. Thus, the
resulting F-score is 0.15 for the procfs-based attack, and 0.15 for
the timing-based attack, which is a 0.0 % advantage over an always-
one oracle.
Figure 20 shows the results of inferring keystroke timings by
detecting the touchscreen interrupt handler’s cache activity using
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Table 3: F-score without and with KeyDrown for state-of-the-art attacks.
Device Side Channel without KeyDrown with KeyDrown
ThinkPad T460s procfs 1.00 0.15
LG Nexus 5 procfs 1.00 0.15
OnePlus 3T procfs 1.00 0.15
ThinkPad T460s Interrupt-timing (rdtsc) 0.94 0.14
LG Nexus 5 Interrupt-timing 0.94 0.14
OnePlus 3T Interrupt-timing 0.99 0.15
ThinkPad T460s Flush+Reload 0.99 0.09
LG Nexus 5 Flush+Reload 0.99 0.02
OnePlus 3T Flush+Reload 0.93 0.10
ThinkPad T460s Prime+Probe on LLC 0.81 0.11
LG Nexus 5 Prime+Probe on LLC 0.80 0.11
OnePlus 3T Prime+Probe on LLC 0.89 0.07
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Figure 15: Timing-based attack on the Nexus 5. (a) The at-
tack allows to clearly detect every single touchscreen inter-
rupt (•). (b) With KeyDrown, the attacker measures fake in-
terrupts (▲) as well as real interrupts (•) and cannot distin-
guish between them.
Multi-Prime+Probe on the OnePlus 3T. We monitored 5 cache sets
in parallel for a higher noise robustness. Without KeyDrown, the
precision is already at a quite low value of 0.80 with a recall of only
1.00, as an access to one of the cache sets by any other application
cannot be distinguished from a cache set access by the touchscreen
interrupt handler. Thus, this attack has a high number of false
positives. If we enable KeyDrown, the precision drops to 0.10, as the
attacker additionally measures the noise generated by the injected
keystrokes. Thus, the F-score is 0.07, which is a ≤−52.7 % advantage
over an always-one oracle.
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Figure 16: Multi-Prime+Probe attack on the 5 cache sets
from 0x382659be to 0x38265abe of touch_irq_handler on the
Nexus 5. (a) Noise negatively affects the detection of single
keystrokes (•). (b) With KeyDrown, the attacker measures
even more cache misses on injected keystrokes (▲) as well
as on real events (•) and cannot distinguish between them.
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Figure 17: Flush+Reload attack on address 0x28ec0 of
libflinger.so on the OnePlus 3T. (a) The attack allows to
clearly detect every single keystroke (•). (b) With KeyDrown,
the attacker measures cache hits on injected keystrokes (▲)
as well as on real events (•) and cannot distinguish between
them.
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Figure 18: procfs-based attack on the OnePlus 3T. (a) With-
out KeyDrown, one can clearly see the interrupts occurring
on real key events. (b) With KeyDrown enabled, the inter-
rupts (•) are hidden in the noise of injected interrupts (▲).
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Figure 19: Timing-based attack on the OnePlus 3T. (a) The
attack allows to clearly detect every single touchscreen in-
terrupt (•). (b) With KeyDrown, the attacker measures fake
interrupts (▲) as well as real interrupts (•) and cannot distin-
guish between them.
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Figure 20: Multi-Prime+Probe attack on the 5
cache sets from 0x3fc0355c28 to 0x3fc0355d68 of
msm_gpio_irq_handler of the OnePlus 3T. (a) Noise neg-
atively affects the detection of single keystrokes (•). (b)
With KeyDrown, the attacker measures even more cache
misses on injected keystrokes (▲) as well as on real events
(•) and cannot distinguish between them.
